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Abstract 
This paper examines the debates among Palestinian intellectuals concerning the functions of collective 
memory and the relative historicity of various modes of historical narration and commemoration, as 
these were deployed on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Palestinian nakba, or catastrophe, 
in 1998. 
Broadly, I examine how and why debates over modes of narration and commemoration of the 
nakba ground dominant understandings of the national function of Palestinian collective memory. 
Specifically, I examine two major interrogations among Palestinian intellectuals concerning the 
adequacy, and the avowed purpose, of modes of narration of the nakba dominant in the 
commemorations in 1998. The first is the relative value of witness testimony, academic history, 
political discourse and literature as modes through which to narrate the nakba; whether the authority 
of these respective modes had, or ought to have, changed in the wake of the Oslo process; and the 
respective authority of the competing agents of narrative attached to them—survivor, historian, 
politician, novelist. The second concerned whether the renewed emphasis on the testimony of 
survivors of the 1948 expulsions enhanced, hindered or precluded historicity in the commemorative 
discourse—and what national role the intellectual might play in mediating the narration of such 
testimony. 
The interpretation is framed by the literature on the uses and dangers of witness, collective and 
vicarious memory in commemorative contexts, and the relative authority of memory and history where 
the two are, or are perceived to be, in conflict. I examine how far critiques of the commemorative 
discourse in 1998 by Palestinian intellectuals drew on these themes—and how far they were 
legitimated by the identification of intellectual concerns with national ones. 
Keywords 
Palestinian history, historicity, intellectuals, nakba, commemoration
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I. 
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’. It means to 
seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of danger… Only that historian will have the 
gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be 
safe from the enemy if he wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious. 
Benjamin1 
One cannot […] have a critical and coherent conception of the world, without having a 
consciousness of its historicity… How is it possible to consider the present, and quite specific 
present, with a mode of thought elaborated for a past that is often remote and superseded? 
Gramsci 
 
The 50th anniversary of the nakba in the spring of 1998 prompted an unquantifiable variety of 
commemorative discourse and events across the Palestinian world2—among the most notable, an 
enormous ‘march of the million’ in the Occupied Territories on 14 May; in Lebanon, a march to the 
mass graves of Sabra and Shateela on the anniversary of Deir Yassin, linking the two most resonant 
massacres in Palestinian national discourse; everywhere films, theatre, poetry readings, music recitals, 
exhibitions of art, posters and photographs; in print a new history of the war of 1948 by the doyen of 
Palestinian historians, Walid Khalidi, serialized in the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat,3 or the proclamation 
of a Manifesto of the 1,000 [Arab intellectuals] for Palestine. Projects to systematically elicit and 
record the testimonies of remaining survivors of the nakba, such as that run by Ramallah’s Khalil 
Sakakini Cultural Centre, were in the spotlight, part of what was portrayed as a race against the 
impending time when the events of 1948 would pass beyond memory.4 The major speeches on the 
anniversary itself were delivered by Yasser Arafat and Mahmoud Darwish, political and cultural 
embodiments respectively of the nation, and the national experience, since 1964. 
                                                     
1  W. Benjamin 1999. ‘On the Concept of History’, in: H. Arendt (ed.), Illuminations. London: Pimlico, p.247. 
2  Commemoration of nakba events: Lectures, Films and Exhibitions, 1999, Ramallah: Sakakini Centre, is one attempt at a 
comprehensive listing, though this covers only the events in and around Ramallah. Two Israeli accounts are primarily 
concerned with the commemorations of the Palestinian community in Israel: H. Frisch 2003. ‘Between Ethnicity and 
Nationalism: Comparing the Nakba Narratives Amongst Arab Palestinians in Israel and Under the Palestinian Authority’, 
Israel Affairs, 9(1&2), 165-186; and B. Kimmerling 1998. ‘Between Celebration of Independence and Commemoration 
of al-Nakbah: The Controversy over the Roots of the Israeli State,’ MESA Bulletin (July), pp. 17-19. 
3  Cf. W. Khalidi 1998. Histoire Véridique de la Conquête de la Palestine. Paris: Livres de la Revue d’Etudes 
Palestiniennes, and, in Arabic, Al-Sahyuniyya fi mi’at am, Beirut: Dar an-Nahar, 1997; Khamsoun ‘aman ‘ala taqsim 
Filastin and Khamsoun ‘aman ‘ala harb Filastin, Beirut: Dar an-Nahar, 1998. 
4  The Sakakini Centre’s website for commemorative material is www.alnakba.org; a useful discussion of the various 
websites dedicated to memorializing the nakba is C. Prestel 2003. ‘The Memory of 1948 and the Internet: Voices from 
Below and the Uses of History’, paper presented at the Fourth Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting, 
Florence & Montecatini Terne 19-23 March, organised by the Mediterranean programme of the Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. Others projects online include the Oral History Project of the 
Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre (SHAML),housed at http://db.shaml.org/library/oralhistory_intro.htm and 
http://www.shaml.org/projects/resaerch/palestinian%20oral%20history%20proj.htm [sic] or Al-Jana’s at 
http://www.oneworld.org/al-jana/html/eng/programs/prog_oral.html. 
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The official commemorations took predictable nationalist forms, inflected to the political moment. 
Arafat’s address to ‘our kinsfolk in the camps and the close and remote places in the diaspora’5 spoke 
to perceptions of his frayed commitment and ability to represent a constituency beyond the Occupied 
Territories—least of all the camp refugees in Lebanon, who had developed their own, oppositional, 
grass-roots commemorative practices to compensate for their marginalization from institutional 
discourse in the wake of Oslo.6 His announcement that ‘we are here to celebrate the memory of the 
catastrophe’—in particular, that ‘I use the word “celebrate” because our being here is a show of 
strength’7—reflected the prevailing tone of the public commemorations: that of self-congratulation for 
half a century of refusal to be ‘red-indianized’,8 to use the favourite analogy. The dominant narrative 
was of endurance and success in the face of overwhelming historical odds. In this the PNA statement 
read by Darwish was typical, its central claim that Palestinians ‘have vanquished all attempts at our 
obliteration and denial and at the eradication of the name of Palestine from the map of Palestine’, and 
were now engaged upon ‘a redemptive journey into the future’.9 
The anniversary did, however, prompt a striking counter-narrative on the part of a number of 
intellectuals: an urgent injunction to historicize, through uninhibited self-criticism, what was decried 
as the linear teleology presented in the nationalist narrative, at a time when that narrative might have 
been expected, on so resonant a commemoration, to be beyond the reach of scrutiny. The theme was 
that of exiles and returnees alike, whether they spoke from Ramallah, Beirut or New York: Yezid 
Sayigh, Rashid Khalidi, Hassan Khader, Elias Sanbar, Musa Budeiri, Mourid Barghouti, Edward Said, 
Mahmoud Darwish to name but a few—none of whom held official posts within the PA, nor were 
defined by their rejection of such posts as opposed to prior, independent, intellectual authority. The 
professions of those who raised this theme—poets, historians, sociologists, journalists, essayists, 
literary critics—made this appeal to historicization through self-criticism read like a manifesto for the 
national, oppositional authority of the intellectual in Palestinian national discourse: an affirmation of 
his autonomy from the carriers of official nationalism, and, thereby, of his resurgent relevance in the 
wake of Oslo. More ambitiously, it could be interpreted as a hopeful attempt—the formulation is 
Richard Rorty’s—‘to make the special needs of the intellectual and the social needs of the community 
coincide’:10 to make it seem, at least, as if the needs of the intellectual and those of the Palestinian 
were perfectly congruent at the historical juncture of this nakba anniversary, carrying the broader 
implication that these needs had been consistently congruent ever since the nakba—as opposed to the 
changing priorities of Palestine’s politicians. 
This analysis was everything but triumphalist. Its manifesto might have been Mourid Barghouti’s 
diagnosis in his memoir of return, I Saw Ramallah, pre-empting the commemorations: that 
‘applauding ourselves is not a viable response to what has happened to us, and it does not help us to 
understand it.’11 Such critics drew the line between suitable and inadequately national uses of history 
in commemoration and public discourse according to whether the commemorative narrative accurately 
represented Palestinian experience and contributed to self-understanding—or was merely used as an 
occasion to reaffirm nationalist pieties, or indulge nostalgia for a golden, pre-nakba age. The spectre 
                                                     
5  Y. Arafat on Palestinian television in Gaza, 0905 gmt, 14 May 1998, translation from the BBC Summary of World News 
[hereafter SWN], May 1998, ME/3228 MED/4 
6  For an account of these practices cf. L. Khalili 2004. ‘Grass-roots commemorations: remembering the land in the camps 
of Lebanon’, Journal of Palestine Studies 34(1), Autumn, pp.6-22. 
7  Y. Arafat, cited in B.McCann, ‘View From The West Bank’, reproduced at  
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1998/israel/palestinian.view/ 
8  E.W. Said 2000. The End of the Peace Process, 2nd edn., London: Granta, p.xxiv. 
9  M. Darwish 1998. ‘The Appeal of the Palestinian People on the 50th Anniversary of the Nakba’, 14 May, 
www.pna.org/mininfo/nakba (italics mine). 
10  Cited in B. Robbins 1993. Secular Vocations: Intellectuals, Professionalism, Culture. London: Verso, p.xiii. 
11  M. Barghouti 2003. I Saw Ramallah. [trans. Ahdaf Soueif], New York: Anchor Books, p.123. 
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that, underlying these critiques, gave them national potency, was that Palestinians, like any ‘who have 
not understood the lessons of the past,’ would forever ‘remain mired in the repetition of the mistakes 
of that past’:12 that a nakba not understood would be without end. 
Debate over how the Palestinians have narrated the nakba, their central national lieu de mémoire,13 
has a long history beginning with Constantine Zurayk’s The Meaning of the Nakba in 1948, the most 
potent statement of the idea that Palestinian survival is bound up in an adequate understanding of the 
complexity of the nakba and, thereby, of its meaning. Abdallah Laroui’s gloss on Zurayk enumerates 
the stringent standards of historicity that critics of discourse on the nakba in 1998 demanded of it: a 
warning that: 
the failure to understand catastrophes is more fatal to a people than the catastrophes themselves. 
To understand them, however, one must be prepared to study the causes (thus believe in the chain 
of events), judge those responsible (thus believe in the freedom of agents), and, lastly, turn this 
understanding into the basis for action (thus believe in the possibility of continually reformulating 
the past event)… To cling to the narrative of one’s ancestors… and to hope nonetheless to change 
the meaning and the weight of the past is parler pour ne rien dire [empty talk].14 
Half a century after the nakba Palestinian discourse on the event, on this understanding, remained 
typified, and shackled, by its refusal to study the event’s causes, on the assumption that Palestinians 
were the guiltless objects of historical forces beyond their ability to influence, and could not have 
prevented their expulsion—thus that calls for self-criticism were meaningless, attempts to make the 
victims partly responsible for the crimes of the perpetrator. The critiques of the commemorative 
discourse displayed in 1998, with or without token prior congratulation for the historical achievements 
of the nationalist discourse, targeted these dominant terms of national discourse on the nakba for 
urgent revision, collective renegotiation or wholesale abandonment as a ‘blind language’, to borrow 
Ghassan Kanafani’s characterization of Arab political discourse in the wake of 1967.15 The 
implication was that these terms had not only run their course but now actively impeded the national 
purpose—the preservation of Palestinian identity—they had been designed to fulfil. Rather than 
individual Palestinian politicians, institutions, political factions, generations or social classes, it was 
the national metanarrative of the nakba itself that was called into question—with some critics openly 
dubious of the adequacy of 1948, or the very concept of nakba, to provide any metanarrative 
appropriate to the collective identity of Palestinians in either present or future. 
The claim that national discourse on the nakba lacked historicity denied its memory and 
commemoration intrinsic value, undermining the dominant representation of memory in Palestinian 
discourse as the means by which Palestine had been saved, and by which it could, and, inevitably, 
would, be redeemed. Underpinning these critiques was the notion that Palestinian memory, while it 
should be preserved, could be not only dangerous but fatal if preserved uncritically. Memory of the 
nakba would, instead, have to be sifted and edited if it were to retain the national function for which it 
had been rightly valued since 1948. This understanding of the function of collective memory, wary of 
the unconditional praise of memory typical of the commemorative events of 1998, is analogous to that 
of such critics of memory discourse as Jacques Le Goff, Tzvetan Todorov or Paul Ricoeur. The 
manifesto of Palestinian intellectuals critical of discourse on the nakba on its 50th anniversary could 
                                                     
12  H. Khader 1998. ‘One Event, Two Signs’, Al-Ahram Weekly, 2 April. 
13  Cf. the characterisation of the nakba enumerated by Ahmad Sa’di: ‘For Palestinians al-Nakbah represents… the loss of 
their homeland, the disintegration of society, the frustration of national aspirations, and the beginning of a hasty process 
of destruction of their culture… [It] is a Palestinian event and a site of collective Palestinian memory; it connects all 
Palestinians to a specific point in time that has become for them “an eternal present”’—A.H.Sa’di 2002. ‘Catastrophe, 
Memory and Identity: al-Nakbah as a Component of Palestinian Identity’, Israel Studies 7(2) Summer, pp.175, 177. 
14  Abdallah Laroui 1974. La Crise des Intellectuels Arabes: traditionalisme ou historicisme? Paris: Maspéro, pp.40-1. 
15  G. Kanafani 1968. ‘Thoughts on Change and the Blind Language’, Muhadarat an-nadwa 1, June. Translated by Barbara 
Harlow, 1990, in Alif 10. 
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equally well have been Le Goff’s injunction: ‘Let us ensure that collective memory serves the 
liberation of men and not their enslavement.’16 The assumption was that collective memory of the 
nakba had the potential to be the instrument of self-enslavement, whether to nationalism or nostalgia 
or both—and that the anniversary was a precious occasion to ensure that a resurgent collective 
memory succumbed to neither. 
Far from fighting the resurgence of memories of the nakba per se, this understanding of the 
purpose of memory asserted instead the authority of intellectuals to edit and contextualize the 
outpouring of memories prompted by the anniversary, thereby endowing them with meaning: to 
transform them, through critical interpretation, into memory as distinct from, if not necessarily 
opposed to, mere recollection. Such a sense of the function of memory affirmed, in Todorov’s 
framework, the need to transform merely ‘literal’ memory of the nakba into ‘exemplary’ memory, 
symbolic of the past and present omissions and evasions of nationalist discourse—the difference being 
that ‘literal memory, especially pushed to its extreme’ as this anniversary invited it to be, ‘carries 
risks, whereas exemplary memory is potentially liberating… Literal usage [of memory], that makes it 
impossible to go beyond the past event, amounts to the subjugation of the present to the past.’17 
Exemplary memory, a contrario, would use such memories exclusively to serve the needs and 
purposes of the present. This distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ collective memory of the nakba 
contrasts, not memory and history, but mémoire and souvenir, as Ricoeur and others have done. 
Ricoeur jokes that ‘the difference between the young and the old is that the old have many more 
souvenirs and much less mémoire’.18 The ambition of critics of discourse on the nakba was, using this 
distinction, to (re-) edit the un- or sloppily-edited souvenirs of the jeel an-nakba into a mémoire suited 
to national purpose: to deconstruct nationalist discourse and reconstruct what was portrayed as a more 
authentic and representative national history. 
The implications of this understanding of the function of collective memory far outstripped the 
issue of how the nakba was to be represented. The centrality of nakba to national and nationalist 
discourse gave a critique of its uses—indeed, of whether it had any use at all—potential to forge a 
space in national discourse from which to critique other, similarly sacred signs of Palestinian identity 
that intellectuals perceived to be in urgent need of revision after Oslo: an ambitious attempt on their 
part to affirm a right to critical reflection in, and on, the national discourse. At stake was not only the 
content of Palestinian national identity but the authority of the modes by which it had been narrated 
and, by extension, long-established and jealously guarded discursive and political claims to the 
authority to narrate it. Bourdieu points out that ‘even the aim of deconstructing the sacred has 
something of the sacrilegious about it.’19 This attempt to deconstruct the sacred, during the most 
resonant commemoration in the history of the nationalist discourse, had to portray itself as national in 
order to conceal its sacrilegiousness. It had, that is, to be couched in the idiom of nationalism to 
challenge that very idiom—at the very least, to portray itself as performing a more urgent national 
duty than the objects of its critique, be they nationalist discourse or survivor testimony. A common 
feature of this critique was, then, the identification of intellectual notions of the privileged social role 
of criticism with existing notions of self-criticism as necessary to national survival. In this context 
intellectual responses to the commemorations were elements of a broader, post-Oslo attempt to 
redefine the limits of the permissible in national discourse, for which the anniversary provided a rare 
opportunity—and which its commemorations sorely disappointed. 
                                                     
16  Cited in T.Todorov 1995. Les Abus de la Mémoire. Paris: Arléa, p.7. 
17  ibid., p.31. 
18  P. Ricoeur, interview with Jean Blain, Lire (October 2000), reproduced at  
http://www.lire.fr/entretien.asp?idC=36471&idTC=4&idR=201&idG= 
19  P. Bourdieu 1992. Les Règles de l’Art: Genèse et Structure du Champ Littéraire, Paris: Seuil, p.304. 
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II. 
‘Rarely can so historical a commemoration have been so lacking in historicity.’20 This opening set the 
tone, and the agenda, of the critique of the commemorative discourse by the Palestinian-Lebanese 
historian and journalist Samir Kassir in the Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes, prompted by the 
commemorations in Lebanon—a critique more sweeping and polemical than most, its assumptions 
over the function of commemoration and the historicity or otherwise of discourse on the nakba a 
useful index of themes that others with similar reservations introduced more subtly or warily. 
Kassir charged that the discursive climate that had surrounded the commemorations had proved 
wholly inadequate to Palestinian needs, and that this inadequacy threatened Palestinians with ‘forever 
having to start from scratch’21—hence the ominous title of his polemic, ‘La nakba recommencée?’, 
implying that all that had been achieved since 1948 could yet be lost by the kind of discursive 
complacency he identified in 1998. Palestinians would fail to overcome the consequences of the nakba 
for as long as they failed to understand its meaning in the present; commemorative discourse had 
precluded such a search for meaning by sanctifying the obstacles to self-criticism. To aspire to such an 
understanding, the terms of national discourse would need to be radically historicized, its most sacred 
symbols, nakba first among them, ‘subjugated’ to Kassir’s understanding of ‘historical criticism’:22 
Of course, the 50th anniversary of the nakba… prompted various historical recapitulations… But 
as for all that touches on the meanings of the nakba—and of its 50th anniversary—the balance 
sheet is unedifying… [I]n all that has been said and written on the commemoration of the nakba, 
the only thing that belongs to 1998 is the fragmentation of a political discourse at a loss without 
referents. Nor is the historicity of the present moment the only thing lacking. That of the event 
being commemorated is no less inadequate… as if today’s historical consciousness had 
accumulated nothing in fifty years!23 
The alleged flaws are read into a successful campaign to prevent the participation of Arab Jews in a 
symposium to commemorate the nakba, part of a season organised by Beiruti intellectuals, Kassir and 
Lebanese novelist Elias Khoury among them, at the Théâtre de Beyrouth, that promised, and was 
prevented from delivering, a ‘critical reading of the last 50 years’ of Palestinian history.’24 The 
frustration of this attempt to incorporate Jews, be they Arab Jews, in public debate on the meaning of 
the nakba is ascribed to a broader immaturity in Palestinian historical understanding: an insistence that 
the experience of the nakba was incommensurable, incomparable and, in some sense, inexplicable; 
and a naïvely ideological, and, thereby, unhistorical approach to Jewish history, usually expressed by a 
failure or refusal to engage with it at all as a relevant component of the Palestinian experience. 
The anniversary had, in Kassir’s analysis, failed to prompt difficult but necessary interrogations on 
the past and future of the national discourse, or to lay that discourse open to critical evaluation, as the 
Théâtre de Beyrouth season had invited it to do—with the threat-laden proviso that ‘the sole 
guarantees for a culture's authenticity and survival lie in its capacity at critical thinking.’25 Old, anti-
historical habits had triumphed instead, their revival all the more distressing for the fact that they had 
been overcome in the past in such affirmations of Palestinian historical agency as the Revolution and 
the first intifada. Instead the temptation to ‘project evil outside oneself’ had resurfaced, denying 
                                                     
20  S. Kassir 1998. ‘La Nakba Recommencée?’, Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes 17 (Autumn), p.59. 
21  ibid., p.65. 
22  ibid., p.63. 
23  ibid., p.64 (italics mine). 
24  Extracts from the manifesto of the Théâtre de Beyrouth programme are at http://www.alnakba.org/nakba/leb-english.htm. 
The panel, entitled ‘Arab Jews: Exile and Roots’, was cancelled after threats from the Syrian Nationalist Socialist Party 
(SNSP), the Abu Nidal group and a ‘Permanent Committee Against Zionist Cultural Invasion’; the contributions of the 
Jewish participants were nonetheless read, in protest, by the organizers. 
25  Théâtre de Beyrouth Statement of Purpose, http://www.alnakba.org/nakba/leb-english.htm 
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Palestinians any responsibility for or agency in their own history, dismissing introspection or self-
evaluation as irrelevant since the historical forces that had determined Palestinian fate since 1948 lay 
outside their control. The broader flaw is identified as a national habit of reifying the nakba that 
precluded its interpretation as a moment of history, abstracted it from any historical context and, 
ultimately, literally, ‘obliterated’ its meaning and any possibility of understanding it.26 Kassir extends 
this logic to other signs of ‘irredentism’ in Palestinian discourse: a generalized obliteration of the 
historical meaning of the major events in Palestinian history, calculated to sustain a defensive, 
teleological and religious understanding of history as an implausible, profoundly unhistorical series of 
unavoidable defeats, with those defeats since the advent of the Revolution portrayed as triumphant successes.  
The call to historicize the nakba is, then, a means to a far broader critique of the use and status of 
symbolic events in Palestinian discourse. Kassir calls for the first intifada to be reduced from the 
status of a ‘conceptual antithesis’ to the Oslo process to being ‘a moment of history’; vicarious 
glorification of Hezbollah’s armed struggle is dismissed as infantile escapism from the hard truth of 
the idea’s failure in Palestinian historical context, and the need to seek answers to national dilemmas 
elsewhere than in the fantasy of military victory; a ‘revolution of Copernican dimensions’ will be 
needed to ‘adapt [Palestinian discourse] to the reality of a conflict that lingers on into the discourse of 
peace.’27 The challenge is Oslo, the tone of the commemorations of 1998 a refusal to engage with Oslo 
as a defeat of the national movement requiring critical rethinking of every element of national 
discourse. The flaws Kassir enumerates mark, he says, a regression to modes of thought that predate, 
and could unmake, the achievements not only of the first intifada but of the Revolution itself. The 
injunction to national discourse is that it must become self-critical enough to demand that its symbols 
be historicized or lose the—undisputed—achievements of the national struggle to date. 
The stringent notion of historicity defended here would be a harsh judge of the value of any 
national commemoration. In effect it denies the commemorating community the right to judge the 
appropriateness of its own commemorative discourse as history, imposing on it demands inappropriate 
to public commemorative discourse in which, as Eric Hobsbawm puts it, ‘our kind of history’—that of 
the historian—is ‘not merely incompatible’ with the uses of history to the commemorating 
community, but ‘destructive of it’.28 Historicity is not the purpose of commemoration, much less of 
nationalist commemoration, and was scarcely to be expected of that of 1998. It is because these 
requirements of commemorative discourse were so self-consciously unrealistic that the wide echo 
among Palestinian intellectuals of similar assumptions about the adequacy of uses of history on this 
anniversary suggests a more ambitious agenda on their behalf. 
III. 
Kassir’s critique extends to the symbolic commemorations. The March of the Million was ‘in and of 
itself a major moment of Palestinian history’, even ‘a conclusive symbol’29—but the ‘lack of echo’ it 
encountered, like that of the Manifesto of the Thousand, is the mark of ‘lost opportunities’, 
opportunities whose loss the urgency of the present crisis could not afford. His ostensible focus on ‘all 
that has been said and written on the commemoration’30 is, though, primarily discursive, concerned 
with what could not be said, and what had not been written: with the limits of the permissible in 
discourse on the successes and failures of Palestinian nationalism, and the dangers of allowing these 
                                                     
26  Kassir, ‘La Nakba Recommencée?’, p.64. 
27  ibid., p.67. 
28  E. Hobsbawm 1998. On History. London: Abacus, p.353. 
29  Kassir, ‘La Nakba Recommencée?’, p.65. 
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limits to be drawn by political actors whose investment in the dominant terms of the discourse made 
them both inapt and fiercely resistant to self-criticism. 
The same concern underlies Salim Tamari’s critique of 1998’s ‘endless lectures and essays 
analyzing the past and reinterpreting it in the light of the present,’31 with his narrower focus on the 
discursive dynamics of the commemorations organised in Ramallah, Jerusalem and Bethlehem by the 
Sakakini Centre, al-Bireh’s Popular Arts Centre and the local universities. Tamari’s target—an 
alarming lack of historicity, not in nationalist discourse, but in the testimony of nakba survivors—is 
more sensitive and problematic. At these events and others like them the world over, pride of place 
went, as it had on previous nakba days, to the inherently poignant testimony of the eyewitness, almost 
invariably a feature of any panel discussion. The scale of the anniversary only comforted this place, 
stressing the imminence of the moment when the nakba would pass beyond memory, thus the rarity 
and value of the testimony of those who could still recollect the expulsions of 1948, regardless of how 
comprehensive, consecutive or historically accurate their narrative might be. Given the value accorded 
to memory in Palestinian discourse as the defence mechanism of an identity denied, the 
sacrilegiousness of questioning, or even attempting to redefine, the terms on which survivor testimony 
was to be valued, as Tamari’s critique does, was exacerbated. In his case, critique of sacred items of 
discourse again suggests the ambitious assertion that the intellectual (in this case the academic) would 
be indispensable to deconstruct—at the very least, to contextualize—witness testimony if such 
testimony were to be a means to historical understanding. The voices of the previously voiceless 
should be elicited and heard in public, but the national meaning of what they were saying could only 
be drawn out if these voices both were not shielded and did not shield themselves from the 
interrogations of an audience that Tamari characterises as perplexed at the narrators for having failed 
to explain their stories adequately. 
The typical testimony of the typical testifier, the 1948 refugee, was, says Tamari, local rather than 
national; dramatic rather than didactic; and, consequently, insufficiently historical to endow these 
memories of the nakba, many of them recounted for the first time, with meaning. The claims are 
emphatic: the ‘absence of the overall picture’ in survivor testimony was ‘astounding’, the ‘fabric of 
daily life that could have explained’ the events of 1948 ‘absent’, the localism of the experience 
recounted ‘overriding’, the testimonies of 1998 unintellectualized fragments of recollection, 
commemorative memory devoid of history. The academic moderators of these testimonies ‘tried in 
vain to provide the social and political background that engulfed the dramatic moment’ of the 
expulsion: ‘to give it the necessary interpretation’.32 Far from such interpretation being recognized as a 
necessary, historicizing complement to a survivor narrative repeatedly recoded by nationalist 
discourse, academics, in Tamari’s version, ‘invariably collided against a barrier of astonishment, 
denial or forgetfulness’33 on the part of the witnesses whom they prompted for context. Implicit in the 
critique is frustration that the audience failed to echo the frustration of the academic, accepting too 
easily that the felt hollowness of nationalist discourse could be countered by an uncritical embrace of 
the discourse of survivors of the 1948 expulsions, superficially more authentic but no less coloured by 
official nationalism, self-justifying or lacking in historicity. 
The oral testimony reproduced in the anniversary Revue d’Etudes Palestiniennes is one 
contemporary anthology34 abundant with national referents—‘exoduses across the whole of 
Palestine’,35 ‘we the Palestinians’; survivors who ‘wept for Palestine’36 as well as, or as opposed to, 
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their village as they fled; mentions of the Arab Higher Committee and Partition Plan—but these can be 
construed as token, evidently coloured by retrospection and a certain defensiveness on the part of 
survivors anxious to avoid blame. Retrospection to the effect that ‘it was as if the fate of the whole of 
Palestine was not in play’37 does, though, suggest a certain self-awareness—if not an implicit 
admission of generational culpability—from the survivors concerning the predominance of the local in 
their experience of a national catastrophe. Much testimony was, then, imbued with the national; it was, 
it seems, the wrong kind of national in Tamari’s estimation, gestures to later, nationalist discourse that 
obscured rather than explained how the nakba was experienced as opposed to how it was later recoded. 
The features of testimony Tamari identifies and objects to in the discourse of 1998 do, though, 
strongly resemble those of history-telling by Palestinian camp women of the nakba generation 
identified by Rosemary Sayigh,38 in which only events that affect the speakers personally are recalled 
and, for all their clarity and detail, recollections are not connected in the national metanarrative that 
male speakers, or younger ones of the PLO generation, would tend to give them. These kinds of 
stories—qissas—are denied the status of history—tarikh—by either speaker or audience, partly due to 
a presumption that history is what is told by men—but also partly for lack of being framed in a 
broader chronological or ideological narrative. The memories of survivors of the nakba generation that 
were excavated in 1998 were indeed atypical of dominant Palestinian narrative to the extent that, 
because they pre-dated nationalist narrative, they could not be relied upon to cohere with it, leaving 
open the possibility that undesirable or repressed memories might be inappropriately brought to the 
surface—notwithstanding that, in the vast majority of cases, they were not. Neither, however, could 
such testimony be used by the historians and intellectuals present at its excavation as some would have 
wished: as a means to historicize the nationalist narrative by deconstructing it, pointing out its flaws 
and bringing to the surface memories it had until now successfully overwritten or hidden from public view. 
Tamari’s plea is for the voice of ‘average people’ to be heard without ideological nationalist self-
censorship. His caveat is that such self-censorship cannot be overcome without mediation and 
‘appropriate tools… so that it can articulate its own experience.’39 It is for ‘new [academic] 
researchers’ to provide both these and suitable fora for testimony, since, for obvious reason, the public 
stage was not the arena best suited to the breaking of taboos. The academic’s moderating role is here 
premised on a portrayal of a professional competence that overlaps with a national need: that the voice 
of the voiceless—the jeel al-nakba, more broadly the refugees as those Palestinians abandoned by 
Oslo—would have to be interpreted if their experience were to be understood, and their claims pressed 
in a present in which they were perceived to be under greater threat than ever before. The imperatives 
Tamari invokes are, then, the same as Kassir’s: not to indulge nostalgia but to transcend it, to 
undermine the story told by the received nationalist narrative—in short, to ‘de-mystify the whole 
ideological discourse.’40 
The commemorative events are ostensibly both target of and evidence for Tamari and Kassir’s 
critiques. Their function, though, is to vindicate critiques of the dominant national discourse’s ability 
to represent Palestinian experience that long predated both this anniversary and Oslo. Criticism on the 
part of intellectuals self-consciously speaking in their role as such targeted the commemorations 
primarily to the extent that these could be deplored as enhancing, and, perversely, sanctifying, existing 
flaws in the protocols of discourse—flaws for which a dearth of historicity was the encompassing 
label. The plea was not that the voice of the intellectual should be listened to, but that it was 
indispensable that the voice of the refugees should be rescued from discourses that failed to represent 
(Contd.)                                                                  
36  Bahjat Abou Gharbiyye, from the villages of al-Qastal and Deir Yassin, cited in ibid, p.56. 
37  Spiro Munayyer, from Lydda, cited in ibid., p.67. 
38  R. Sayigh 1998. ‘Palestinian Camp Women as Tellers of History’, Journal of Palestine Studies 27(2) (Winter). 
39  Tamari, ‘Bourgeois Nostalgia’, p.178. 
40  ibid., p.179. 
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them, and that the voice of the intellectual would be necessary, albeit perhaps not sufficient, to rescue 
that of the refugee. The refugees, sidelined by Oslo, would need help to reclaim a nationalist discourse 
that misrepresented their experience, and threatened their existence, at the moment of pretending to 
defend and celebrate both; they could not be allowed to squander a rare moment when their experience 
could be restored where it belonged: to the centre of national discourse. The authority invoked to 
deconstruct the Palestinian national metanarrative as unsound would, however, require a consensus 
between critic and audience on the national value of criticism—in this case secular, historical 
criticism—and the national authority of the intellectual as prophetic critic. Critique of the lack of 
historicity in the testimonies of nakba survivors, could, then, be interpreted primarily as a shortcut to 
targeting the sanctity of the later nationalist metanarrative that had shaped and censored their 
memories. More broadly, the claim was that criticism and self-criticism were in themselves national 
values, or should be perceived—should always have been perceived—as such; and that nationalism’s 
critics were fulfilling a national role valid beyond any personal or political frustration that might have 
provided other, less evocative grounds for their critique. 
IV. 
Such assumptions pervaded intellectual interventions around the nakba anniversary and its 
commemorations. Self-criticism was explained and justified as a national value by reference to what 
its absence has precluded, and would preclude in the future: the self-understanding required for 
survival; the ability of Palestinians to ‘come to terms with themselves’ or ‘with their own history’, 
where historical understanding was invariably associated with maturity and self-realization—in other words, 
with an end to the misfortune brought on by a nakba perceived not in the past but in the present continuous. 
This dimension of the call to historicity through self-criticism was especially pronounced in 
critiques in which academic diagnosis took the tone, form, authority and liberty of personal reflection. 
Yezid Sayigh’s portrayal of the value and necessity of self-criticism, part of the series of reflections by 
prominent intellectuals in the Journal of Palestine Studies, was among the most intricate, its key 
theme that the potential for the experiences of the nakba to be adequately articulated had been hitherto 
denied by the mode, and the protocols, of nationalist discourse. ‘All along’—that is, ever since 1948—
‘it has been possible to be critical of the role of this class or that leader, yet too often this uses a 
levelling, nationalist measure that… suppresses other claims to 1948.’41 It had, that is, been possible to 
be critical of everything but the metanarrative that was the feature of Palestinian discourse most in 
need of criticism. Portrayed as a personal revolt against the ‘tyranny’ this nationalist measure had 
imposed on female, subaltern and non-institutional voices, an essentially intellectual claim, rejecting 
the sanctification of any nationalist discourse (in line with the author’s professed post-nationalism), 
paints the self-congratulatory public grandstanding of nationalist discourse in the present as inherently 
incapable of encompassing the personal in Palestinian experience. The deconstruction of the 
experience of the nakba that is the centrepiece to this wider dissatisfaction is portrayed as a national 
imperative on the grounds that those with suppressed claims to 1948 have, and must be entitled to, the 
‘varied and layered memories, feelings and even readings of 1948’42 denied them by dominant 
nationalist discourse. National discourse would have to grow mature enough to reflect and 
accommodate the personal experience of any and every Palestinian—the Palestinian fragment, to 
borrow Gyanendra Pandey’s term43—including disillusion with, and felt exclusion from, the dominant 
narrative. Hassan Khader’s condemnation of its inability to do so, in Darwish’s Al-Karmel, was 
harsher still: ‘Self-criticism was not absent [in the wake of Oslo]; it was downright impossible, 
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because it had never been present’, forever postponed to an easing of the state of emergency that never 
came44. By impairing its ability to represent national experience, the historical cost of elevating the 
nationalist narrative above criticism had, Khader continued, been ‘exorbitant’.45  
Of these critics Rashid Khalidi and Edward Said were, on the anniversary, the voices most insistent 
that Palestinians should ‘accept at least partial responsibility for their fate’46 rather than be content 
with a narrative that portrayed them as perpetual but resilient victims, their misfortune to be stoically 
endured while waiting for the inevitable arrival of historical justice. Yezid Sayigh’s exhortation was 
similar: ‘Palestinians must see themselves as agents in their own history, secure in the knowledge that 
it is possible to evaluate critically the role of various Palestinian individuals, groups and strata and to 
acknowledge their contribution to undesirable historical outcomes.’47 In this sense the call to 
historicity was in part a call to re-establish the Palestinians as subjects rather than mere objects of their 
own history, by reformulating the discursive sign—nakba—that had come to its critics to symbolize 
and perpetuate Palestinian objecthood. 
The primary characteristics of nakba as discursive sign across the previous half-century indicate 
how profoundly against national and nationalist habit this injunction to self-criticism was. The 
historical currency of the term was, in Khader’s analysis, premised on three themes, each of them 
militating against the assumption of historical agency: deference to nature, resignation to fate, and a 
collective relinquishment of responsibility. That the sign should have survived through to 1998 as a 
combination of these features is, again, ascribed to a single cause: ‘the absence of critical Palestinian 
self-analysis’ that would have long ago pronounced these connotations of nakba inadequate to the 
Palestinian present.48 Mourid Barghouti, again in a personal memoir, is blunter still: ‘disasters do not 
fall on people’s heads’,49 and colluding in the fantasy that they could preclude their ever being overcome. 
An open scepticism that 1948 even deserves to be considered as the source of common national 
experience underlies several of these critiques. Sayigh, circumspectly, acknowledges 1948 as ‘just… a 
landmark and a turning point’50 as opposed to the vanishing point of Palestinian experience, or as 
radical a break from the history that preceded it as it was usually portrayed, to the extent that the 
nakba had ever been portrayed as a moment of a historical process at all. This personal dissatisfaction 
with the ability of the dominant narrative to represent legitimates what is evidently a professional, and 
would-be national, diagnosis: ‘I cannot conceive of understanding 1948, nor its meaning for 
Palestinians today, unless it is bound internally to what went before and what came after’; ‘viewing 
it… statically as fixed in time and space fails completely to satisfy me.’51 Sayigh’s demand is for a 
‘critical reinterpretation of self’,52 Rashid Khalidi’s for explicit acknowledgement of the Palestinians’ 
own pre-nakba historical failures as a community as a means to understand and address the history 
that resulted from them. The failure to historicize is, again, portrayed as mortal: Palestinians ‘must’ 
historicize, recognize and acknowledge their own agency if they are ‘ever to put forth a credible 
demand for recognition of the injury they have suffered’, let alone have that injury addressed or 
repaired.53 The language is urgently imperative: self-criticism ‘will be necessary’; history ‘has to be let 
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back in [to national discourse]’. Palestinians ‘must understand’ Jewish history; narratives and signs 
‘will have to evolve’.54 
The elements of this assumption of prophetic authority are gathered in Edward Said’s intervention 
on the anniversary, identifying historicization through self-criticism as a perfectly congruent 
intellectual, political and national duty: 
As intellectuals and historians we have a duty to look at our history, the history of our leaderships, 
and of our institutions with a new critical eye… These are serious, and even crucial matters, and 
they cannot either be left unanswered or postponed indefinitely under the guise of national defence 
and national unity.55 
The implication is that intellectuals were—potentially the only—plausible producers and guardians 
of a historical understanding appropriate to the present state of national emergency, because they were, 
by virtue of their professional adherence to intellectual values, uniquely open to, and competent for, 
the required task of self-criticism. A similar sense of self-representation of the intellectual as keeper of 
a national cause betrayed by the political class underlies many of these critiques of nakba discourse. 
Arafat is reported to have told Hanan Ashwari at the outset of the Oslo process that ‘the next phase is 
not one for poets and intellectuals. It’s the era of hard-core politicians.’56 The implication of 
intellectual discourse on and around this nakba anniversary was that the current phase was precisely one in 
which Palestinian poets and intellectuals would be called upon to repair the desertions of the politicians. 
Hassan Khader’s was the most aggressive form of the critique of the concept of nakba itself, as a 
linguistic sign incapable of representing the complexity of Palestinian identity as opposed to 
producing endlessly similar, undifferentiated memory in an artificially nationalist key. It is no 
coincidence that he should also have published among the most critical of the essays on the experience 
of return in the wake of Oslo that appeared in Al-Karmel in the year leading up to the 50th anniversary, 
its plaintive theme ‘I did not find my homeland in the homeland.’57 Having been drawn by his own, 
disappointing return to reformulate the terms of the promise embodied in the discursive sign of ‘awda, 
Khader’s sober deconstruction of nakba is the nearest these pieces come to an explicit attack on the 
value of pre-Oslo national symbols generally, as irredeemable signs of immaturity: ‘While nakba may 
have shrouded’—shrouded, not articulated—‘what the Palestinians were incapable of doing or 
expressing five decades ago… [the event is] in need of a revision of its signs’—a task ‘more urgent 
than ever’ on its 50th anniversary. The will, and the courage, to engage in the task of revision would be 
‘proof that the Palestinian narrative has reached the age of maturity’ for the first time since 1948—but 
such will and courage would require a comprehensive ‘backlash’58 against all that had been previously 
invested in the nakba as sign and, by extension, in the dominant narrative that was predictably 
recycled, and exaggerated, on this anniversary.  
Immaturity, on the other hand, would be displayed by going through the motions of previous 
commemorations—Khader’s example is the public recitation of the names of the destroyed Palestinian 
villages that was as typical a feature of worldwide commemorations of the nakba in 1998 as it had 
been on previous anniversaries. What is needed, the implication runs, is a radical historicization of 
memory: a war against nostalgia and the insufficiently sophisticated praise of memory as an 
unconditional good. Khader’s stark conclusion is that the continued absence of self-criticism of 
national discourse on the nakba would be unsustainable, however valid or necessary the reasons for its 
suppression may or may not once have been. 
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*** 
Local and individual political agendas were evidently not absent from these critiques. The coincidence 
and forcefulness of their respective conclusions can easily be traced to causes more personal than 
national or intellectual, and the appeal to self-criticism portrayed as a useful means to assert or redeem 
the oppositional status of individual critics, in particular those critics involved in the Oslo negotiations, 
or perceived as overly close to the PA since. The rhetoric of self-criticism had a political resonance 
particularly appropriate to a moment when whatever optimism had accompanied the early years of the 
Oslo process had evaporated, and the legitimacy of the carriers of the dominant nationalist discourse 
was in acute crisis. Since the aims and outlook of Palestinian nationalism were widely felt to have lost 
what congruence they had with Palestinian identity in the present, the appeal to criticize the traditional 
formulations of nationalism could claim, and convey, national as opposed to partisan purpose by 
painting such signs as nakba as too important, and too perishable, to be formulated by a PA that had 
ceased to merit the PLO’s claim to represent the Palestinian people rather than that arbitrary minority 
of it which the PA pretended to rule over. Critiques of the dominant narrative were, then, as much 
discursive power claims on the part of intellectuals as political actors as on behalf of the marginalized 
voices they claimed to represent; self-criticism, more than an intellectual value, could be the keystone 
of an oppositional political discourse capable and amenable of portrayal as free of partisan intent or 
political ambition. 
To target nationalist narrative was, of course, inseparable from targeting its carriers in the present; 
personal, academic or intellectual reflections were inevitably political. The commemorations were a 
rare opportunity for these political critiques to be cast in personal tones: for oppositional intellectuals 
to be able to speak on the same terms, and with the same, personal authority, as any other Palestinian 
invited to excavate their own memory on the public stage—rather than as the negotiators, politicians, 
or intellectuals with a duty of loyalty to nationalist discourse that they had been for all or part of the 
previous three decades. If the official commemorations were an occasion for the PA to buy itself time 
by spending some of the remaining capital nationalist discourse invested it with, the commemorative 
modes of the reflective essay and reminiscence temporarily lifted the intellectual’s duties towards that 
discourse. Personalized critique no longer needed to be prefaced with a paean to the historical 
achievements of the PLO to be admissible. 
The potential for running political, intellectual and personal argument concurrently is especially 
apparent in the piece by Yezid Sayigh cited above. This deprecates the representativeness of his own, 
privileged experience of the nakba, highlights the ‘narcissism of intellectuals’ and the hollowness of 
their claims to represent the subaltern, acknowledges the author’s own ‘intellectualization’ of 1948 
and ‘middle-class’ upbringing, and the part of this untypically ‘cosmopolitan’ upbringing in shaping 
his beliefs, ability and eagerness for criticism—yet still it ends with a thoroughly prescriptive call for 
‘rethinking, decoupling and reclaiming 1948’ as a ‘necessity’: a challenge to all Palestinians because a 
distinct challenge to himself as a Palestinian. The call is for an insurrection against the traditional 
carriers and mediators of Palestinian memory and history: a call that would be valid regardless of the 
motives or background of its author because prompted by the inability of nationalist discourse to 
represent, not only the middle-class intelligentsia’s experience of the nakba, but that of any Palestinian 
ill-served by nationalist discourse. 
A different fusion between tentative but radical claims grounded in the lived experience of being a 
Palestinian, and as such beyond criticism, but coincident with intellectual beliefs expressed in the 
critic’s academic work and political opposition to the PA, is Musa Budeiri’s. As a political 
commentator, Budeiri holds that ‘it is clear… that the constituency of the PA is not the Palestinians’,59 
as a historian, that a Palestinian national identity was forged in exile and not in Palestine itself. The 
same assumptions are displayed in his role as a reminiscing Palestinian: Budeiri is ‘not sure that 1948 
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constitutes a watershed’ for all Palestinians, and deems the ring of the word nakba ‘hollow’. An 
especially revealing sentence—revealing because so awake to the sacrilegiousness of the sentiment it 
expresses—runs: ‘although I hesitate even to allow myself to think this (at least most of the time), I 
sometimes imagine that after 1948 there was not a single Palestinian people, but numerous ones… without 
much in common’:60 an interpretation discouraged, if not prohibited, by nationalist discourse on the 
nakba but, portrayed as a courageous surmounting of nationalist habits of thought and speech for the 
sake of accurately establishing the author’s personal experience, one that aspires to the undisputed 
discursive authority of survivor testimony. 
*** 
Self-criticism as the prerequisite to a necessary process of historicization was, then, the guiding theme 
of intellectual discourse on the anniversary, not only in reaction to a commemorative discourse 
portrayed as disappointing and dangerous, but in anticipation of the anniversary as a rare moment of 
opportunity, and as an indirect verdict on the dangers of Oslo five years on. The assumption of such a 
theme had to be that the Oslo process, meaningful or otherwise, had changed the rules, perhaps even 
the purpose, of Palestinian national discourse in general, and the discourse of Palestinian intellectuals 
in particular. Darwish later portrayed Oslo as having inaugurated a new era: ‘the right time’ for 
‘contemplating the self, expressing disappointment, self-criticism… even sarcasm… towards the 
national flag.’61 The reasons for such sarcasm on the anniversary of the nakba gestured at a broader 
sense of role: the assumption that the ambition of any intellectual, be he poet, novelist or historian, 
should be to free his work from determination by national rather than universal standards. Darwish, 
again, expresses the position best: ‘Our country has certain rights over us [intellectuals], but these 
rights must not be exercised at the expense of [intellectual work] for ever.’62 Oslo could, then, be 
understood as a step towards the normalization of Palestinian existence that had altered the previous 
balance of power between the claims of national emergency on Palestinian intellectuals and the 
autonomy that they aspired to sui generis. To be merciless towards the failures of the national 
metanarrative was to exercise this newfound autonomy. 
The account of the significance of the anniversary by the then director of Ramallah’s Sakakini 
Centre, Adila Laidi, combined the themes implicit in each of the major critiques, from the claim that 
‘now, because the primary concern is not survival, there is time to reflect’ to a conclusion of studied 
ambiguity: ‘now that we are lucky enough to control part of the land, it is a great time for people to 
remember what happened in 1948.’63 The shared assumption is that the territorialization of the national 
movement had inaugurated both the possibility of self-criticism and the urgency of it. Oslo’s blurring 
of the hitherto clearly defined lines between homeland and exile had necessarily affected the 
appropriateness of the concepts that had sustained national discourse, and warranted their 
reformulation, regardless of how appropriate these concepts now seemed. The argument that the 
‘imagined constructs of the homeland had to be reformulated’64 needed not imply that these constructs 
had always—that they had ever—been inadequate, though in practice the implication was usually 
present—merely that Oslo had changed the circumstances that had previously imposed deference to 
nationalist rhetoric, and its symbols. 
Had Oslo really reunited Palestinians—albeit some, untypically privileged Palestinians—with their 
land in significant enough a fashion to override the fear of disappearance that had hitherto determined 
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the terms of national discourse—thus to allow for, let alone require, the new era of self-criticism that 
these Palestinians called for? The answer implicit in much of the discourse was that the qualified 
return of Oslo did indeed mark the beginning of a reintegration into place and, thereby, into historical 
time. Darwish’s speech on the anniversary assumed that with Oslo Palestine, though it had not yet 
‘returned’ in any meaningful sense, had nonetheless changed direction: that it had begun the process of 
‘returning to contemporary history after 50 years’, reversing the dynamic of the previous half-
century.65 Self-criticism had been inappropriate while the primary concern of the Palestinian was 
survival as such, and the primary function of Palestinian narrative—especially that of the historian or 
poet tasked with preserving national memory—to provide the tools for national survival. Since partial 
reintegration into territory and history had secured the recognized national status of the Palestinians 
within the territory of Palestine more firmly than at any time since the nakba, the barriers to self-
examination, self-imposed to sustain national unity in time of perpetual crisis, had been lifted. Far 
from a new argument at odds with previous nationalist discourse, the right to self-criticism could be 
conceived of as one that the total quality of absence from the homeland had unjustly denied 
Palestinian discourse until Oslo, that had been won back through the achievement of a partial 
repatriation, no matter how imperfect—and that needed to be exercised if this initial step towards 
‘return’ were to have meaning, and other steps towards a more significant return were to follow. 
Whether this portrayal could convince any but the intellectuals who drew this lesson from Oslo, or 
found it politically useful to draw it, is doubtful. Its appeal is best explained by the need, among 
disappointed returnees and those who resigned from political positions during or after Oslo, to 
reformulate their former roles in the national movement. One means of doing so was to reinterpret the 
culture of national emergency that had hitherto demanded solidarity above criticism as now, for the 
same reasons as before, requiring criticism above solidarity, enabling intellectuals to engage in a role 
more congenial to them than loyalty to the PLO had ever been: that of unbridled critical opposition. 
This presumption that the role and duty of the intellectual was to be critical and oppositional, and to 
strive to create the circumstances required to free his criticism from national constraints, had long been 
a prominent part of Said and Darwish’s self–fashioning. The perception of a normalized role for the 
intellectual in the new era that Oslo had begun was characteristic of the intelligentsia that returned 
with the PLO in 1994 and was swiftly disabused by the PA, the product of a collective sense that the 
symbols of nationalist discourse were no longer convincing or viable to those who had accomplished 
an imperfect return, and who thus felt both entitled and obliged to subject these symbols to analysis on 
terms that might previously have been deemed heretical. 
V. 
The dynamics of this commemoration, like those of any commemoration, were far less favourable to 
the expression of qualified uncertainty and doubt than they were to the loud certainties of nationalist 
rhetoric. On the one hand was the celebratory rhetoric of the PA, jealously guarding its authority to 
monopolize the meaning of national symbols from those seeking, for whatever purpose, to redefine 
them. On the other, and, arguably, a reaction to the PA’s perceived inadequacy, was a resurgent 
discursive authority for witness testimony, expressed in a form and public fora that scarcely allowed 
for, let alone invited, the mediation that intellectuals wished to provide it with.  
The central role of witness memory in nakba commemoration was scarcely new, though the 
quantity, novelty and poignancy of it and, perhaps, the scale and number of the public fora in which it 
was elicited, materially affected its discursive power. The primary discursive phenomenon in 1998, as 
reported by Tamari, was, to cite Ilana Bet-Al on the power of memory in last years of the former 
Yugoslavia, an overwhelming power to the words ‘I remember’—words that in the Palestinian context 
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of 1998 shared enough of the traits listed below to frustrate intellectuals’ ambitions to interpret the 
experiences remembered, contextualize and historicize them: 
‘I remember’ [is] the power of an event long past, exerting itself upon the present, the power of an 
individual over a collective, the power of opinion over fact [which cannot] easily be discredited as 
untrue… ‘I remember’ is not an exchange—it is an authoritative statement, based on the stark 
power of personal conviction… [and] resistant to contestation by others.’66 
In Bet-Al’s account, memories ‘poured out in an incessant stream’ in Yugoslavia from the mid-
1980s onwards, as the artificial constructions of nationalism unravelled and other, older sources of 
authority were sought to fill the gap.67 The testimonies Tamari responded to ‘kept on flowing in a 
manner that confounded both narrators and listeners’,68 to an extent unparalleled on previous nakba 
days. No academic understanding of the social function of history, or of the academic mediation of these 
memories as necessary, could reasonably be superimposed upon so powerful a set of discursive dynamics. 
While the commemorations were, then, a thankless moment for the critiques I have outlined, they 
could nonetheless be seen as valuable for the opportunity they provided to confirm the post-Oslo 
reformulation of the role of the Palestinian intellectual. Arguably the most interesting thesis to account 
for this reformulation is that of the Franco-Palestinian historian Elias Sanbar, who holds that the 
fundamental change to occur as a direct consequence of partial reterritorialization was in the role of 
the historian and, more generally, of those intellectuals, poets and novelists included, tasked with 
articulating Palestinian experience. Oslo, in Sanbar’s account of Palestinian historiography, modified, 
not the purpose of the national discourse, but the historian’s ability to define the modes of his work 
rather than have them dictated to him by the national state of emergency. ‘With reintegration into the 
land it was as if, freed from his political duties, the historian could, without renouncing his national 
engagement… outgrow the registers of defence and illustration’69 of the legitimacy of the national 
cause. Sanbar characterises the plural sources of authority for the role of history and the historian in 
national discourse prior to Oslo as follows. Beginning with the nakba: 
history, insofar as it is supposed to ward off disappearance, is a ‘science of urgency’, [hence] the 
central, even disproportionate, place now occupied by the historian [in national discourse]. An 
emblematic figure leading the ‘scientific’ and the national struggle concurrently, the historian is he 
who knows, all at once, how to draw the lessons of history, to safeguard the past that is denied 
from its assailants, and, most importantly of all, to provide the scientific arguments necessary to 
establish the accuracy and the legitimacy of [national] aspirations.70 
On this account, perhaps the major lesson of the commemorations of 1998 was that not only 
historians but intellectuals in general were newly emboldened to demand that the modes appropriate to 
fulfilling their national responsibilities be rethought on terms determined, not by loyalty to any 
political ideology, but by professional duties as historians and intellectuals that outstripped the duties 
of loyalty because they fulfilled these better than loyalty ever could. The results of such boldness had, 
in Sanbar’s account, become amply visible by 1998: 
After Oslo… finally it [has become] possible to leave behind the defensive approach [to history 
writing]. A parallel and hugely important phenomenon, albeit unrelated to history stricto sensu, is 
also emerging in the field of the novel! It concerns works whose substance is composed of 
narratives of the nakba… Well might this surprise many. Could it really be that the Palestinians 
have never actually recounted what happened to them?… Paradoxical as it may seem, the 
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Palestinians, for so long as their exile remained absolute, have scarcely recounted their exodus, as 
opposed to its consequences… As if the absolute quality of their absence from their land forbade the 
narration of the genesis of that absence for so long as a return to the land had not been set in motion.71 
Sanbar’s evidence that Oslo had partially liberated intellectual work from the shackles of 
nationalist efficiency includes the post-Oslo works of Faisal Hourani and the—Lebanese—novelist 
Elias Khoury,72 or the histories of Yezid Sayigh and Walid Khalidi. Limited though the phenomenon 
might be to a very few exemplary works, not all of them by Palestinians, Sanbar’s is as coherent an 
explanation as any for changes in the self-representation, and the work, of Palestinian intellectuals 
since Oslo, to the extent that it encompasses all registers of intellectual work, any of which could 
conceive of themselves as newly entitled—even duty-bound—to rethink how it might serve the 
national cause most efficiently, thus the mode in which Palestinian history, fiction or poetry should be 
written. The pervasive call to self-criticism might, then, be interpreted as a phenomenon whereby 
intellectuals persuaded themselves that national protocols of discourse and narration, designed for a 
state of national emergency in which absence from the land was total and the constant, articulate 
affirmation of Palestinian presence a duty outstripping any other, were newly amenable to revision. 
Tamari had seen Oslo as the opportunity to free Palestinian sociology from being a discipline de 
combat, its purpose and remit defined by nationalism, to define itself on its own, disciplinary terms.73 
The parallel trends in historiography equally suit such an interpretation, with representations of the 
nakba seen as especially ripe for criticism because the nakba was that lieu de mémoire through which 
modes of thinking about the purposes of memory might be most searchingly and effectively questioned. 
The starkest account of the intellectual’s frustrations with the ahistorical nature of national 
discourse in 1998 is to be found in the fiction that Sanbar cites as hopeful evidence of change—in 
particular, in the discourse of the narrator of Elias Khoury’s novel of the nakba, Bab ash-Shams, a 
novel whose ambitions to historicize collective memory of the nakba rest as much on its extensive 
critique of national and nationalist discourse as in its claim to be the first large-scale fictional attempt 
to narrate the nakba. Khoury’s narrator, Khalil, is easily interpreted as the suppressed voice in every 
Palestinian, rebelling against the two dominant discourses that had, by 1998, become empty and 
unsatisfactory. The first is that of Younes the fida’i, symbol of the Revolution, who spends the novel 
in a coma and eventually dies in what it is tempting but far too crude to interpret as an allegory of 
nationalist discourse and faith therein. The second is that of Khalil’s grandmother, who endlessly 
repeats stories of the nakba from the beginning, min al-awwal, never organising them into a coherent 
narrative. The first is a nationalist discourse that has long ceased to represent Khalil’s experience as an 
average Palestinian, camp refugee and sometime fida’i moyen sensuel, neither hero nor traitor. The 
second is a private one that has prevented Khalil’s understanding the nakba that he, like the vast 
majority of Palestinians alive in 1998, suffered the consequences of without living through. 
Of Younes, Khalil demands the recognition that ‘“the old language is dead”’ and must be buried. 
Of his grandmother, he complains that her recollections ‘“told me nothing”’, that she ‘“drowned”’ and 
‘“submerged”’ him beneath her stories of the nakba, that as a result he ‘“knows no complete story”’ as 
opposed to incoherent fragments, signifying nothing. (His mother, similarly, ‘“told [him] nothing”’, 
‘“abandoning history”’74 to the grandmother who alone knew that history first-hand, but failed to 
convey it.) The critiques of nationalist and survivor discourse meet in Khalil’s despairing question of 
both his grandmother and Younes: ‘“Why do your stories all sound the same?”’75  
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Ultimately the appeal to both discourses—that of the revolutionary and that of the survivor—is the 
same: ‘“I don’t want to hear the same story again. I want to understand!… Let us not return to Ain El-
Zeitoun [a village destroyed by Israel in 1948]! Our history begins where Ain El-Zeitoun came to an 
end.”’76 Younes the fida’i insists that ‘“We mustn’t count the years, we must forget. The years go by, 
and it doesn’t count! Twenty, thirty, fifty or a hundred, what difference does it make?”’77 The mortal 
danger of such an insistence on the irrelevance of historical time—the impermeability to historical 
change, the consequent inability to react to it—is at the heart of Khalil’s critique of discourse on the 
nakba and, by extension, of Khoury’s. Fifty years of nakba mattered, not because they were fifty, but 
because the historical moment of the anniversary required historicity in Palestinian discourse more 
urgently than at any other point in those fifty years. 
Khoury’s thesis is that literature might be able, as political discourse had not been, to give voice to 
experiences of the nakba not determined by or recoded to fit the nationalist narrative—for instance by 
putting such experiences into the mouth of fictional characters immune from political admonishment 
or reprisals. Literature might thus be the only form adequate to prompt the recovery of memories 
buried and proscribed by nationalist narrative, enabling a new discourse truer to the complexity of 
Palestinian experience. In Khoury’s interpretation, ‘“since the image of the Palestinian portrayed in 
literature and the dominant ideology was of heroism and martyrdom, I think the novel [Bab ash-
Shams] helped liberate people by telling the stories of humiliation and interior defeat that they never 
told”’78. The purpose of the intellectual call to historicization as portrayed here is to free authentic 
memories of the nakba from the editing of nationalism: to provide Palestinians with the tools to 
overthrow the tyranny of nationalist discourse, self-imposed and otherwise, were they only to accept 
these tools fashioned on their behalf by intellectuals; to embrace rather than repress feelings and 
memories of defeat, disunity and scandals, the better to incorporate them into an authentically 
representative narrative. The implication of Bab ash-Shams, like that of other intellectual discourse on 
the anniversary, was that experience of the nakba was, fifty years on, too sophisticated to be 
articulated by political discourse—and that historians and novelists were now those called upon to 
remedy this deficit of historicity. 
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